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This paper studies how a rise in China's share of U.S. imports could lower pass-through of exchange
rates to U.S. import prices. We develop a theoretical model with variable markups showing that the
presence of exports from a country with a fixed exchange rate could alter the competitive environment
in the U.S. market. In particular, this encourages exporters from other countries to lower markups
in response to a U.S. depreciation, thereby moderating the pass-through to import prices. Free entry
is found to further moderate the pass-through, in that a U.S. depreciation encourages entry of exporters
whose costs are shielded by the fixed exchange rate, which further intensifies the competitive pressure
on other exporters. The model predicts that certain conditions are necessary to facilitate this 'China
explanation' for falling pass-through, including a 'North America bias' in U.S. preferences. The model
also produces a log-linear structural equation for pass-through regressions indicating how to include
the China share. Panel regressions over 1993–1999 support the prediction that a high China share in
imports lowers pass-through to U.S. import prices.
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1.  Introduction 
  Exchange rate movements have several potentially important implications for the 
domestic macroeconomy, including inflation variability, monetary policy effectiveness, and 
current account adjustment. But the importance of these implications depends in part on how 
much of the exchange rate movements are passed through to changes in import prices. A number 
of recent papers have found evidence indicating a decline in exchange rate pass-through to 
import prices in the U.S. While there appears to be agreement within the literature surveyed in 
Goldberg and Knetter (1997) that the pass through in the 1980s was around 0.5, several papers 
find much lower estimates for recent years. Marazzi et al (2005) estimate that the pass-through 
coefficient for U.S. imports has declined gradually from 0.5 to around 0.2, and similar results are 
found in Olivei (2002) and Gust et al (2006). It is less clear how this decline in pass through 
applies to other countries, and how it applies to prices at the consumer level.
1 
  Several potential explanations have been proposed for how pass-through might decline. 
Taylor (2000) suggested that and environment of lower inflation might discourage firms from 
adjusting import prices. Campa and Goldberg (2005) suggest and find evidence in support of the 
idea that the composition of imports has shifted toward goods that are less sensitive to exchange 
rates, that is, away from energy and toward manufactures. Others have suggested that the 
competitive environment for imports has changed. Included in this group are Gust et al (2006), 
which propose that increased trade integration has made exports more responsive to the prices of 
their competitors.  They develop a dynamic model with endogenous entry decisions and markups 
                                                 
1 Ihrig et al, (2006) document a fall in pass-through in other G-7 countries, and Marazzi et al (2005) for Japan and 
less strongly for Germany. Campa and Goldberg (2005) find that the decline in pass through is statistically 
significant in only 4 of the 23 OECD countries they study, and in particular for the U.S. they do not find a 
significant decline. Campa and Goldberg (2006) find evidence that the pass through to retail prices may have 





that respond endogenously to entry. Also in this category would be the proposition by Marazzi et 
al (2005) that the increased role of China as a source of U.S. imports has lowered pass-through, 
both due to the direct effect of its stable exchange rate against the dollar, and by inducing a 
competitive response in the exporters of other countries.   
Evidence varies regarding which of these types of channels is relevant. Campa and 
Goldberg (2005) find in their multi-country study that pass-through tends to be stable within 
industry categories, but that the change in composition can account for much of any overall fall 
in aggregate pass-through.  While the evidence in Marazzi et al (2005) agrees that a falling share 
of oil imports plays a role, nonetheless, evidence is found that pass-through has fallen across a 
wide range of goods.  Further, they also find a correlation between industries that experienced a 
fall in pass-through and those that experienced the strongest increase in Chinese imports. 
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for exploring 
how the rise of China as a supplier to the U.S. could have altered the competitive environment 
for U.S. imports, and thereby generate time-variation in pass-through. The theory draws upon 
recent developments in trade theory to shed light on this issue, including endogenous entry and 
markup decisions by firms. The explanation we develop is similar in spirit to that in Dornbusch 
(1987), in that the market share of the fixed-exchange rate country in our model affects pass-
through in the same manner as the market share of domestic firms does in Dornbusch’s model.
2 
Gust et al (2006) also draws similar inspiration from trade literature in its study of pass-through. 
We differ from both of these papers in our use of translog preferences to generate time-variation 
in markups and pass-through. In fact, we regard the extension of translog expenditure function 
                                                 
2 Dornbusch was the first to show how market share influences the degree of pass-through, using a model of 
Cournot competition.  Our model instead uses monopolistic competition, but allows market share to affects pass-
through by using a utility form that is not CES.  Note that our translog expenditure form is not a special case of the 




found in our paper’s several propositions to be a theoretical contribution that could be of use in 
studying a range of other issues. Finally, we also note that the lessons developed in our model 
are not restricted to China, but are relevant for understanding the effects of changing market 
share more broadly of all trading partners with fixed exchange rates.  
  We consider a three-country model with the United States, Mexico and China. We 
eliminate any role for U.S. competing firms to affect the pass-though of exchange rates by 
supposing that the United States only sells a homogeneous exported good. Our focus is on the 
interplay of Mexican and Chinese exporters to the U.S., both of whom sell a differentiated good. 
The peso is treated as floating, of course, while the yuan (or renminbi) is fixed. In section 2 we 
give a basic outline of the monetary model, which features wages that are fixed in the short-run. 
Beyond the simple distinction between the short-run (with fixed wages) and the long-run (with 
flexible wages), we do not introduce any further dynamics into the model. 
  In section 3, we analyze the pricing decisions of Mexican and Chinese exporters to the 
U.S. market. We use a translog expenditure function to model U.S. demand. As previously 
analyzed by Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001), this expenditure function allows for endogenous 
markups that vary with the exchange rate, thereby leading to incomplete pass-through. In 
addition, this expenditure function can be used even when the number of firms varies due to free 
entry under monopolistic competition (Bergin and Feenstra, 2006). In that case, it is necessary to 
solve for the reservation prices of goods that are not available (i.e. prices when demand is zero). 
In this paper we extend the results of Feenstra (2003) in solving for reservation prices, obtaining 
a reduced-form expenditure function that allows for a taste bias in favor of some goods. In 
particular, we shall suppose that U.S. buyers have a taste bias in favor of Mexican goods, due to 




  In section 4, we analyze the pass-through of exchange rates treating the number of firms 
as fixed. Competition from China diminishes the pass-through of the peso exchange rate to the 
price of U.S. imports from Mexico. We show that when we aggregate up to multilateral import 
prices and exchange rates – by aggregating over Mexico and China – then pass-through is still 
incomplete (even though we have assumed no competing U.S. firms). The incomplete pass-
through is related to our assumed taste bias in favor of Mexico, and becomes more pronounced 
as the number of competing Chinese exporters grows. So competition between China and 
Mexico – in the presence of a U.S. taste bias – results in incomplete pass-through. 
  In section 5, we examine the empirical implication using disaggregate U.S. import data 
from the 1990s. Like Marazzi et al (2005, pp. 21-23), we test whether having more competition 
from China results in lower pass-through coefficients at an industry level, and find support for 
this hypothesis.
3 Section 6 extends the model by allowing for the free entry of firms, which can 
occur in response to monetary and exchange rates shocks. In that case we simulate the model, 
and find a further reason for incomplete pass-through: a monetary expansion in the U.S. leads to 
greater entry of firms in China, creating an extra competitive effect that leads to lower import 
prices.  So the free entry of firms lowers the pass-through of the dollar further. Conclusions are 
provided in section 7, and the proofs of Proposition are gathered in the Appendix. 
 
2.  Countries, Commodities and Currencies 
  There are three countries: Mexico (denoted by x) , China (denoted y for yuan), and the 
Untied States (denoted by z). The U.S. produces the z good, which can be thought of as an 
                                                 
3 Our empirical investigation differs from Marazzi et al (2005) in several respects. Foremost, we develop a 
theoretical justification for including the China share as a structural component of a pass-through regression. In 
terms of estimation differences, we run a pooled panel pass-through regression across industries and time, rather 




homogeneous good (e.g. agriculture), and exports it to both Mexico and China. One unit of labor 
produces one unit of the z good, so the price of the U.S. good equals the wage, wz. China and 
Mexico produce a differentiated good that is sold back to the United States. Their prices are px  
(in pesos) and py (in yuan), which are common across all the varieties sold by each country. The 
$/peso exchange rate is ex, so the $ price of imports from Mexico is expx, and the $/yuan 
exchange rate is  y e , so the $ price of imports from China is  y yp e . Note that  y e  is a fixed 
exchange rate, whereas ex is flexible. 
  We model the cash-in-advance constraint as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000). Each 
government provides a money transfer of Mi, i = x, y, z to home residents at the beginning of the 
period, and imposes an identical tax at the end of the period after all transactions are made. 
Money will then serve as a unit of account in each country, but does not have any distortionary 
effect by itself. We presume that expenditure in each country equals the money supply from the 
cash-in-advance constraints. Under balanced trade, expenditure in turn equals the value of 
output. With labor as the only factor of production, and with zero profits (due to free entry, 
discussed in section 6), the money supply in each country therefore equals wage income: 
   i i i L w M = ,     i = x, y, z.  (1) 
  Each country spends a fraction β of wage income on its own, homogeneous good. In the 
United States, the remaining fraction (1–β) of expenditure is spent on the differentiated good, 
imported from either China or Mexico.  For Mexico and China, the remaining (1–β) of income is 
spent on the U.S. homogeneous good. For example, Mexican spending on the U.S. good is 
                                                                                                                                                             
changes in China share across industries. Our data also differ, in that exchange rate and tariff measures (from 




x x x M ) 1 ( L w ) 1 ( β − = β − . The peso price of the U.S. good equals the $ price wz (since one unit 
of labor produces one unit of output) divided by the peso exchange rate ex : 
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Likewise, Chinese demand is: 
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where the yuan exchange rate,  y e , is fixed. Finally, U.S. demand for its own good is:  






Summing all the demands we get the U.S. equilibrium condition, 
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  While (2) has been derived as the goods market equilibrium condition for the U.S., it can 
also be interpreted as asset market equilibrium condition for dollars. Multiplying both sides of 
the equation by wz, the right of (2) is the U.S. money supply Mz. On the left, the first term is the 
U.S. dollars that Mexican consumers would need to purchase from the U.S.; the second term is 
the dollars that Chinese consumers would need; and the third term is the dollars that U.S. 
consumers need to purchase their local good. So under the assumption that consumers use the 
currency of the selling country, (2) can be interpreted as the asset market equilibrium condition 




  We  assume that wages are fixed at the beginning of the period, and that labor supply is 
demand determined. We can model the specifics of the wage-setting mechanism as in Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000), which leads to a nominal wage  i w that is fixed in the short-run.
 4 
Determining the Mexican exchange rate 
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   ⇒   z y y x x M M e M e = + . (3) 
A 1% increase in the U.S. money supply can be accommodated by a 1% increase in ex (a 
depreciation of the dollar) and a 1% increase in the Chinese money supply (to keep  y e fixed). In 
the background, there is 1% more of the U.S. good produced, which is consumed both in the 
U.S. (due to increased expenditure), in China (due to increased expenditure) and in Mexico (due 
to an appreciation of the peso and lower prices there). 
  Notice that if China does not accommodate the U.S. monetary expansion by increasing its 
money supply in the same proportion, then the peso will appreciate by a different amount. In 
general, given some assumption on the responsiveness of My to Mz, then (3) is enough to 
determine the peso exchange ex in the short-run. In sections 3 and 4, we will not need to make 
                                                 
4 We can follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) in specifying expected utility for agent h as  ] ) h ( L ) / a ( ) h ( C [ln E
ε ε − , 
where C is the Cobb-Douglas consumption index over home and foreign goods with home share β described in the 
text above. Due to the fact that the consumption sub-index over foreign varieties for the U.S. is only implicitly 
defined under our translog preferences to follow, we apply the derivation of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) only for the 
cases of Mexico and China. Fortunately, solving for pass-through in our model requires us to find wage levels and 
hence costs for these two countries only (and we omit the country subscript). Consumers choose consumption and 
their own wage w(h) to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint and the demand for labor type h, 
L ] w / ) h ( w [ ) h ( L
φ − = , where w and L are CES indexes over the wages w(h) and labor demands L(h). Then it can be 
shown that optimal wage setting by each agent leads  to the  aggregate wage  ] P / ' LU [ E / ] ' LU [ E )] 1 /( [ w C L − φ φ − = , 




any particular assumption on the responsiveness of My to Mz, and hence on the movement in the 
peso rate ex. In section 6, however, we will use the asset market equilibrium condition for yuan 
to show how the Chinese money supply My changes in response to the U.S. money supply Mz, 
and therefore solve the equilibrium change in the peso rate ex.  
 
3.  Translog Expenditure Function 
  A fraction (1-β) of expenditure in the U.S. is spent on imported differentiated goods, 
produced by Mexico and China. Since the work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), a common choice 
for the utility function defined over the differentiated products has been the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) form. Despite its tractability, this functional form has serious drawbacks for 
the analysis of firm’s pricing. Since optimal prices are a constant markup over marginal costs, 
there is no strategic interaction between the firms.   
  This special feature of the CES need not carry over to other choices of the sub-utility 
function.  We will consider a sub-utility function defined by the dual expenditure function which 
is assumed to have a translog form. That is, given nominal expenditure E, the sub-utility from 
consumption of the differentiated products 1,…,N is u = E/e(p), where the unit-expenditure 
function e(p) is defined by: 
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i i 0 p ln p ln p ln ) p e    ( ln ,    (4) 
with γ γ ij ji = . The parameter N ~  is the maximum number of possible products, but many of these 
might not be produced: the prices used for products not available should equal their reservation 
prices (where demand is zero). Notice that in the CES case the reservation prices are infinite, so 
                                                                                                                                                             




these prices drop out of the CES expenditure function (where the infinite prices are raised to a 
negative power). But in the translog case we need to explicitly solve for the reservation prices. 
  In order for the translog expenditure function to be homogeneous of degree one, we need 
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We will further require that all goods enter “symmetrically” in the γij coefficients, and impose 
that additional restrictions that: 
, j i for











γ − = γ  with i, j = 1,…,N
~
.    (6) 
Notice that we do not restrict the αi coefficients beyond the restriction in (5). That is in contrast  
to Feenstra (2003), who added the further restriction that  . N ~ / 1 i = α  
  We now show how the symmetry restrictions in (6) allow us to solve for the reservation 
prices for goods not available, substitute these back into the expenditure function in (4), and 
obtain a reduced-form expenditure function that is very convenient to work with. In particular, 
this reduced-form expenditure function remains valid even as the number of available products – 
which we denote by N – varies. The following Proposition generalizes the result in Feenstra  
(2003), by allowing for αi terms that are not symmetric: 
 
Proposition 1 
Suppose that the symmetry restriction (6), with γ > 0, are imposed on the expenditure function 
(4). In addition, suppose that only the goods i=1,…,N are available, so that the reservation prices 
j p ~  for j=N+1,…, N
~
 are used. Then the expenditure function becomes: 
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where, 
   j i for N / c and , N / ) 1 N ( c ij ii ≠ γ = − γ − =  with i, j = 1,…,N,       (8) 
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a ,    (10) 
Notice that the expenditure function in (7) looks like a conventional translog function, but 
now defined over the available goods i=1,…,N, while the symmetry restrictions in (6) continue 
to hold on the coefficients cij. To interpret (9), it implies each of the coefficients αi is increased 
by the same amount to ensure that the coefficients ai sum to unity over i=1,…,N. The term a0 in 
(10) incorporates the coefficients αi of the unavailable products. If the number of available 
products N rises, then a0 falls, indicating a welfare gain from increasing the number of products.  
   With this Proposition, we can work with the expenditure function in (7), knowing that 
the reservation prices for unavailable goods are being solved for in the background. We can 






j ij i i p c a s . (11) 
The parameters cij in (11) are symmetric over goods sold by Mexico and China, indicating equal 
substitution between these goods. We shall put further structure on the taste ai parameters by 
supposing that the United States has a bias towards goods made in Mexico, due to its proximity, 




any variety from China. From (9) we see that the assumption  y x a a >  is equivalent to  y x α > α , 
but that the ax and ay parameters also depend on the number of available goods N. 
  For products from Mexico, the U.S. dollar price is  x x i e p p = , and for products from 
China the U.S. dollar price is  y y i e p p = . We assume that these prices are common across the 
firms from each country (due to identical costs), and denoting the number of Mexican varieties 
by Nx and the number of Chinese varieties by Ny, with  N N N y x = + . Then using (8), the share  
equations are simplified as: 
  [] ) p e ln( ) p e ln(
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Using these demand equations, we next solve for the firm’s optimal prices, and then the pass-
through of the exchange rate. 
 
4.  Pass-though of Exchange Rates with Fixed Number of Firms 
 
  From the perspective of a firm selling one of the differentiated products, the elasticity of 
demand for the input is computed from (11) as 
N s
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We will ignore uncertainty about the exchange rate, and suppose that firms set prices (in their 
own currencies) after knowing the exchange rate. One unit of production uses one unit of labor 
in either country. Then each firm will optimally choose its price as, 




























  The expenditure share can be substituted from (12) to obtain an expression for the 
optimal price in (13), in terms of its marginal cost and the prices of its competitors. However, 
this expression is nonlinear (involving the level of prices on the left, and the log of prices on the 
right), and cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal price.  So instead, we will consider taking 
an approximation to (13) that will allow us to obtain a simple solution for the price.  Taking logs 
of both sides of (13) and using  ) 1 N ( / N s )] 1 N ( / N s 1 ln[ i i − γ ≈ − γ +   which is valid for si small, 
we obtain:  
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  These are two equations to solve for the two prices – of Mexican and Chinese goods – 
depending on the peso exchange rate (since the yuan exchange rate is fixed). Expressing the 
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N y x y x 1 1 .       
It follows that we can solve for the $ import prices by inverting the above matrix, and after some 
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where,   )] w e ln( ) w e [ln( ) [( A y y x x y x − γ − α − α ≡ . (15c) 
Holding wages fixed, we solve for the effect of a dollar depreciation – as reflected in the peso 
rate – on the $ prices of Mexican and Chinese goods: 
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  We see that the dollar depreciation will raise the $ price of Mexican goods, but by an 
amount less than unity. The greater is the number of Chinese varieties – reflecting more 
competition from China – the smaller is the pass-through coefficient in (16a). The rise in the $ 
price of Mexican goods will also induce a rise in the $ price of Chinese goods in (16b), but by an 
amount that becomes small as the number of Mexican varieties shrinks. 
 
Pass-through of the multilateral exchange rate 
  The above equations (16) show the pass-through of the peso rate to dollar prices of 
Mexican and Chinese goods. In practice, pass-through is often measured using multilateral 
(aggregate) import prices and exchange rates. To achieve that here, define and import price and 
multilateral exchange rate: 
   ) p e ln( ) N s ( ) p e ln( ) N s ( P ln y y y y x x x x m + ≡ , (17a) 
   ) e ln( ) N s ( ) e ln( ) N s ( E ln y y y x x x m + ≡ . (17b) 
The weights using in these aggregates reflect the import shares of each firm selling from Mexico 
and China, sx and sy, respectively, times the number of firms, Nx and Ny. So sxNx is the share of 




(sxNx + syNy) = 1. We shall treat these shares as constant when differentiating the aggregates (as 
they would be in any price index), obtaining: 
   ) p e ln( d ) N s ( ) p e ln( d ) N s ( P ln d y y y y x x x x m + = , (18a) 
   ), e ln( d ) N s ( E ln d x x x m =  (18b) 
where in (18b) we make use of the fact that the yuan exchange rate is fixed. Then multiplying 
(16a) by sxNx and (16b) by syNy and summing these equations, we obtain: 
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s
s s















− =   iff   . 0 ) s s ( y x > −  (19) 
  Thus, pass-through of the multilateral exchange rate is incomplete provided that the per-
firm (or per-product) share of Mexico exports to the U.S. exceeds that for China,  . 0 ) s s ( y x > −  
The intuition for this result is as follows. Equation (16a) shows that Mexican pass-through is 
lowered by a high number of competing Chinese firms. But for Chinese prices, equation (16b) 
shows that there is some price rise even though there is no movement in China’s bilateral 
exchange rate. As a result, when computing the multilateral exchange rate and multilateral pass 
through as averages over the two countries, a high weight on China tends to raise rather than 
lower pass-through in (19). So pass through is lowered by having a large number of Chinese 
firms while at the same time not having a large overall China share; this combination is possible 
only if the per-firm share for Chinese firms is small. In short, the main lesson is that pass-
through is reduced by having a large number of Chinese firms active in the U.S. market, rather 
than by a large Chinese market share per se. 
  The condition of a smaller per-firm share for Chinese firms is likely to hold given our 
earlier assumption that the United States has a taste bias for Mexican goods. Using (9), (12), and 
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where  )] w e ln( ) w e [ln( ) [( A y y x x y x − γ − α − α ≡ , as in (15c). Provided that A > 0, then 
0 ) s s ( y x > −  and there is incomplete pass-through of the multilateral exchange rate: 
 
Proposition 2 
Provided that A > 0, then multilateral pass-through in (19) is less than unity and is decreasing in 
Ny. If 0 < A < 1, then pass-through falls for any increase in Ny satisfying  . 0 N ln d N ln d y ≥ >  
 
  We see that provided the taste bias in favor of Mexico exceeds the wage differences 
between the two countries, so that A > 0, then pass-through is incomplete. It is easy to show that 
pass-through declines as the number of varieties coming from China grows, holding N fixed.  
We further show in the Appendix that any increase in Ny exceeding the percentage increase in N, 
0 N ln d N ln d y ≥ > , will lower pass-through, using the mild additional restriction that A < 1. 
The inequality  0 N ln d N ln d y ≥ >  is satisfied, for example, by an increase in Ny holding Nx  
fixed. So greater competition from China lowers the extent of pass-through.  
  It is worth reminding the reader that we have not considered competing U.S. firms in our 
model, thereby ruling out the most obvious reason for incomplete pass-through, i.e. domestic 
competition. What we have found is that the competition between Mexico and China, in the 
presence of a U.S. taste bias towards Mexico – what we shall call a ‘North America bias’ – plays 
much the same role as would domestic competition in dampening exchange rate pass-through. 
Stately less formally, we are suggesting that the integration of the North American market 




potential explanation for the declining pass-though during the 1990s that has been observed for 
the United States. 
 
Estimating Equation 
  Using (15), (17) and (20), the import price index Pm  is solved as: 
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≡  > 0 provided that A > 0.  (21c) 
Equation (21a) shows that the translog expenditure function leads to a log-linear equation for the 
import price. The first term on the right of (21a), 1/γ(N – 1), reflects the monopoly markup. The 
second term on the right,  m E ~ ln , equals the weighted exchange rate adjusted for wages in the 
countries, or what we call multilateral labor costs. This term also appears in the third term on the 
right of (21), but now it is specified as the difference between the multilateral labor costs and the 
dollar wages paid in China. This third term is actually an interaction between the Chinese import 
share, ) N s ( y y , and the multilateral labor costs relative to the Chinese wage. An increase in the 
Chinese share lowers U.S. import prices provided that  ). w e ln( E ~ ln y y m >  The coefficient of this 
interaction term is B, which depends on the Chinese and Mexican import shares for each variety 
in (21c). While B is not a constant in theory, we shall treat it as constant over time (and across 




  In practice the real exchange rate is constructed as an index, and it is quite difficult to 
meaningfully compare its level with the level of Chinese dollar wages. So when estimating (21) 
we shall re-write it as:
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The multilateral labor costs  m E ~ ln  now appears with a coefficient less than unity, in the second 
term on the right. The magnitude of that coefficient depends on the Chinese import share, which 
enters as an interaction with  m E ~ ln . An increase in the Chinese share reduces the extent of 
exchange rate pass-through. The third term on the right of (22) is an interaction between the 
Chinese import share and Chinese dollar wages. If wages where treated as constant over the 
estimation period, then the third term is just the Chinese share itself, which can enter with a 
positive or negative coefficient (depending on the sign of  ) w e ln( y y ); alternatively, the Chinese 
wages can be treated as a time trend. The final term on the right of (22) is another interaction 
term arising from the translog specification, between the Chinese share and one minus that share,  
which enters with a positive coefficient since  γ α − α / ) ( y x > 0.  
 
 
5.  Pass-through in the United States 
  With these initial theoretical results, we turn to an empirical test of the model using data 
for disaggregate U.S. imports. In particular, we test the hypothesis that having more competition 
                                                 
5 Since our model is structural, in principle we could back out the structural parameters from the reduced form 
regressions. But since we only estimate one of these equations, the import price equation without the import demand 




from China results in lower pass-through coefficients during the 1990s. We first discuss the data 
used, and then estimate the pricing equation.  
 
International Data 
  We make use of a dataset constructed by Feenstra, Reinsdorf and Slaughter (2007).  The 
dataset uses detailed monthly price data gathered by the International Price Program (IPP) at the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to construct Törnqvist price indexes from September 1993 to 
December 1999. The use of these indexes are preferred to the Laspeyres versions that are 
published by BLS, and follow our definitions in (18) more closely.
6 Feenstra, Reinsdorf and 
Slaughter (2007) use these data to analyze the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which 
eliminated tariffs on all high-technology products beginning in 1997. Because their focus is on 
the ITA products, which requires special treatment for tariffs, and few of these products were 
supplied by China over the 1993-99 period, we focus here on non-ITA products. 
  Törnqvist price indices for import prices are constructed for each 5-digit Enduse industry 
using annual trade weights.  From month t-1 to t in import sector j, the Törnqvist price index is:  



























t , 1 t
Mj p
p
ln w exp P ,        ( 2 3 )  
where: 
t
mi p  denotes the price for disaggregate import commodity i in month t;
7 Ij is the set of  
commodities included in a particular import or export 5-digit Enduse industry j; and the weights  
t
mi w  denote the annual import shares for commodity i within industry j.
 8 
                                                 
6  The Törnqvist price indexes were constructed for the study by Alterman, Diewert and C. Feenstra (1999), which 
compared alternatives to the Laspeyres formula now used by IPP. 
7  The disaggregate import and export prices that we start with are at the “classification group” level use by BLS, 
which is similar to the HS 10-digit level. 
8 Though a proper monthly price index would use monthly trade weights, at this level of disaggregation these 




  In addition to the import price index, we have constructed several other indexes: (i) the 
price index of exports for each 5-digit Enduse industry, denoted 
t , 1 t
Xj P
− , which uses the  
disaggregate export prices  t
xi p in a Törnqvist formula like (23); (i) a price index of ad valorem 
tariffs for each 5-digit Enduse industry, denoted by 
t , 1 t
j Tar
− , which uses disaggregate tariffs in a 
Törnqvist formula like (23); (iii) and a weighted average of the exchange rate times the producer 
price indexes (PPI) for U.S. trading partners, denoted by 
t , 1 t
j
− Exch_PPI . In this index we start 
with nominal exchange rates times the PPI for each country, average these across source 
countries for U.S. imports (using import country weights), and then aggregate these across 
commodities again using the Törnqvist formula (with import commodity weights). 
  We gauge Chinese competition by the share of U.S. import purchases coming from China  
plus Hong Kong, or what we simply call the Chinese import share, within each 5-digit Enduse  
industry. These are measured from annual U.S. trade data from Feenstra, Romalis and Schott 
(1989). The Chinese import shares in each broad Enduse sector are illustrated in Figure 1. For 
the entire sample used in the regression analysis below, including capital goods, automobiles and 
parts, consumer goods and chemicals, but excluding all products covered by the ITA, the average 
share of Chinese imports grew steadily from 9% in 1993 to 14% in 1999.
9 The highest Chinese 
import share occurs in consumer goods, where the share rises from 16 to 24% over the course of 
the sample. In contrast, the Chinese share of capital goods accounted for only 1 to 2.5% of U.S. 
imports, and the Chinese share in ITA products fell from 7.5% to 5% over the period. 
  For comparison, in Figure 2 we illustrate the North American share of U.S. imports, 
defined as the import share coming from Canada plus Mexico. For the total sample of non-ITA 
                                                 
9 The rise in China’s share came at the expense in part of other Asian exporters, some of which fixed their own 




products, the North American share was relatively flat, growing from 20% in 1993 to 23.5% in 
1999. For the ITA products, the North American share increased the most, from below 20% to 
27%. The North America share of consumer goods grow modestly from an initial low of 12% to 
16.5% in 1999, while capital goods (which exclude autos) had a higher share but were generally 
flat and even declined over certain parts of the sample period.  
 
Impact of Chinese Competition on Exchange Rate Pass-through 
  Cumulating the monthly indexes defined above, let  t
Mj P,  t
Xj P,   t
j Tar , and  t
j PPI * Exch  
denote the cumulative indexes of import prices (tariff-inclusive), export prices, tariffs, and the 
exchange rate times the PPI for trading partners, in each 5-digit Enduse industry. We shall 
estimate the pass-through of exchange rates by pooling across a large subset of U.S. import data.  
All of the regressions described in Table 1 draw on Enduse categories 2 (capital goods), 3 
(automobiles and parts) and 4 (consumer goods excluding automobiles). We exclude agricultural 
goods and most raw materials (Enduse 0 and 1).
 10 But chemicals, Enduse 125, comprises several 
large and important categories of goods and hence is included as well.   
  We initially consider the following price regression in Table 1: 















A ,    (24) 
where  j α  is a 5-digit Enduse fixed effect, and we include the current monthly value and 6 lags  
of the effective exchange rate  A − t
j Exch_PPI . Generally, pass-through regressions should include 
prices of goods that compete with the imports, such as domestic U.S. prices. Because these price 
                                                 
10 The agriculture and raw materials Enduse categories (0 and 1, respectively) do not always match imports and 
exports, and hence our U.S. export prices cannot be used as a control in the import price equation. Also excluded are 
all 5-digit Enduse industries that contain some products covered by the ITA. After these selections, the dataset 




indexes are not available on an Enduse basis for the U.S., we have instead included the U.S. 
export prices  t
Xj P  in each 5-digit Enduse industry.  
  Panel (A) of Table 1 shows the results using the entire sample of non-agricultural, non-
ITA products. The fixed-effects ordinary least squares (FE-OLS) estimate of regression (1) 
shows incomplete pass-through of exchange rates of  0.40, with a smaller coefficient on the 
export price. The remaining specifications test the effect of Chinese competition on pass-
through, by interacting the exchange rate with the share of Chinese imports in each Enduse 
category: 
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   (25) 
The sum of the coefficients  A δ  on the interaction term is the incremental pass-through due to 
changing the China share from zero to one. The additional terms  t
j Z  appearing in (25) are control 
variables such as imports tariffs, the Chinese share of imports and other terms suggested by (22). 
  In regression (2) of Table 1(A), we include the interaction between the exchange rate and 
the Chinese import share. The FE-OLS estimate of ∑ δ
A A  is positive but small. From the 
structural equation in (22), however, we know that additional controls are needed: treating the 
Chinese wage  ) w e ln( y y  as a constant, we should include the Chinese import share itself as a 
control, as shown in regression (3). In that case, the interaction term of the exchange rate with 
the Chinese share becomes negative, with a coefficient of –0.4, and statistically significant.  
  In regression (4) we further add other controls suggested by the structural equation (22):  




between the Chinese share and time; and the final term in (22) is an interaction between the 
Chinese share and one minus that share. We also include import tariffs; even though the import 
prices are tariff-free, changes in the tariff levels will still affect import prices under imperfect 
competition, as in our model. Including these additional controls more than doubles the 
magnitude of OLS coefficient on the interaction term, from –0.4 to –0.95. To interpret the 
estimate of  –0.95, an increase in the Chinese share from 9% to 14%, as occurred during the 
sample period, lowers pass-through by 0.95×0.05 = 0.047, or roughly 10% of its estimated 
magnitude over our sample period 1993–1999. 
  The FE-OLS estimates discussed so far are consistent, but the standard errors are 
incorrect if the data are nonstationary. In fact, we are unable to reject nonstationarity in the 
logged series of import prices, export prices and effective exchange rate variables at the 5% 
level, using the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) panel unit root test, assuming individual effects and 
trends. We further perform tests to determine whether these three variables are cointegrated. 
Specifically, IPS panel unit root tests like those above are conducted on the residuals from 
regression (4). We reject the unit root in the residuals at the 1% level, supporting a hypothesis of 
cointegration. This result likely reflects the fact that we are using disaggregated industry-level 
data rather than full national aggregate import prices, where the latter is the norm in the macro 
literature. Aggregation bias, of the type demonstrated in Imbs et al (2005), is less likely to 
contaminate our industry- level data.  
  Consequently, we estimate our pass-through regressions taking account of cointegration, 
rather than estimating in first differences. Fortunately, a new estimator ‘pooled mean group’ 




by Blackburne and Frank (2007), which is maximum likelihood for cointegrated panels.
11 To 
explain this estimator, denote the right-hand side variables in (25) that have unit-roots by  t
j X,  
which includes the effective exchange rate  t
j Exch_PPI , its interaction with the Chinese share, 
and the exports price  t
Xj P ln . Denote the coefficients of these lagged variables by the vector 
, q ,..., 0 , )' , , ( j j j j = γ δ β = η A A A A A  where we assume the same lag length q for all variables but  
allow the coefficients to vary across Enduse categories j. Further add the auto-regressive term 
1 - t
Mj P ln j ρ  onto the right of (25).
12 Then the resulting equation can be equivalently written in the 
error-correction form as: 
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A      (26) 
where 0 ) 1 ( j j < ρ − − = φ  indicates the speed of adjustment to the long run, and we assume that  
j
q
0 j /φ η − = η ∑ = A A . That is, the PMG estimator allows for differing short-run coefficients  A j η   
and  A j θ  across Enduse categories, but assumes that the long-run coefficients η appearing within 
the error-correction vector are identical. This assumption allows us to pool across Enduse 
categories to obtain the maximum likelihood long-run estimates. 
  In the remaining columns of Table 1 we show the PMG estimates. In specification (5) 
using only the effective exchange rate and the export price, we obtain exactly the same pass-
through estimates of 0.4 as in the OLS estimates. Adding the interaction with the China import  
share in specification (6), the coefficient is tightly estimated at –0.6, and remains about the same 
when the import tariffs are added into the long-run relationship in specification (7). Note that the 
                                                 




PMG estimator does not rely on using the China share as a control, or the China share times one 
minus the share, because these variables are omitted from estimation. This occurs because the 
China share is measured on an annual basis, so in first-differences it varies only in January of 
each year. STATA omits this variable from estimation within the first-differenced variables 
A − Δ t
j X  in (26), and hence, does not accept it into the error-correction term either. 
  A final coefficient reported in Table 1 is the estimate of the adjustment parameters  j φ , 
which are averaged across the Enduse categories. The averaged estimate is –0.17 or –0.18, and is 
significantly difference from zero. If the panel was not cointegrated, then we would expect this 
coefficient to be zero, so its estimate further supports the cointegration of the panel. 
  A greater impact of the rising Chinese share is obtained from the subset of the data for 
consumer goods, in Table l panel (B), in which Chinese competition is strong and rising. The 
FE-OLS specification in regression (4) has a coefficient on the interaction between the Chinese 
share and exchange rate of –1.16, along with a pass-through coefficient of –0.54. For this sector, 
the Chinese share shown in Figure 1 has increase from about 16% to 24% over 1993-1999, 
which lowers pass-through by 1.16×0.08 = 0.09, or 17% of its estimated magnitude. In the PMG 
estimates in specification (7), the interaction term becomes –0.73, along with a pass-through 
coefficient of –0.47. In this case, the rising Chinese import share lowers pass-through by 
0.73×0.08 = 0.06, or 12% of its estimated magnitude. So according to either estimate, the impact 
of Chinese competition on reducing pass-through is greater for consumer goods than for the total 
sample of consumer goods, capital goods, autos and chemicals. 
We have also examined the other major Enduse sectors within the total sample of non-
ITA commodities (i.e. capital goods, autos and chemicals), as well as the Enduse categories that 
                                                                                                                                                             




include imports covered by the ITA. The results are sensitive to the estimator (FE-OLS versus 
PMG), as well as to the controls that are included in the specification. Sometimes the interaction 
of the China import share with the exchange rate has a negative coefficient, as implied by our 
theory, but in other specifications with the same Enduse category, the interaction term can 
become positive. The common feature of all these Enduse categories is that they have a small 
share of imports from China during the sample period. In contrast, consumer goods shown in 
Table 1(B) have a large and rising import share from China. So we conclude, not surprisingly, 
that the impact of Chinese competition on pass-through can be reliably estimated only for goods 
where the imports from China are substantial. 
 
6.  Free Entry of Firms 
  In the previous section we solved for the multilateral pass-through in (19) while treating 
the number of products sold by Mexico and China as fixed. But as suggested by Proposition 2, 
an increase in the number of products sold into the U.S. can dampen pass-through. We now 
explore the impact of free entry by firms. We begin by computing the full short-run equilibrium 
of the model, with fixed wages but allowing for free entry; we also determine the change in the 
Chinese money supply needed to sustain the fixed exchange rate. Allowing for free entry and the 
endogenous Chinese money supply results in a five equation system to determine equilibrium, 
which we will analyze by simulation. 
  With expenditure in the United States equal to Mz (from the cash-in-advance constraint), 
and the fraction (1–β) spent on the differentiated good, the expenditure on each Mexican and 
Chinese good sold in the U.S. is  z x M ) 1 ( s β −  and  z y M ) 1 ( s β − , respectively. From the first-
order condition (13), we readily calculate that profits (before deducting fixed costs) are then 
                                                                                                                                                             




i z i i / M ) 1 ( s η β − = π . The free-entry or zero-profit condition in Mexico and China ensures that 
profits equal fixed costs  i i i i z i f w e / M ) 1 ( s = η β − . Using the formula for the elasticity of 
demand, the free-entry condition can be written as: 





















,     i = x, y.  (27) 
This condition along with (20) provides 4 equations in 4 unknowns: si and Ni, i = x,y.  
  A solution to this system is not guaranteed, however. For example, if A = 0 then it is 
readily apparent that Nx and Ny do not appear at all in the system: we have  N / 1 si =  from (20), 
and then we solve for N from (27) provided that  x x x f w e  =  y y y f w e . In that case we solve for 
the total number of products sold in the U.S. but with an indeterminate number coming from 
each country. Conversely, if  x x x f w e  ≠  y y y f w e  then we would obtain a boundary solution 
where either all products come from Mexico or all come from China.  These situations also apply 
to a model with CES demand and two exporting countries, where it is most likely that zero-
profits are obtained in only one exporting country (with negative profits in the other); or, if zero-
profits hold in both exporting countries because costs are identical, then we could not solve for 
the number of products exported from each but only the total number of products exported.  
  When A > 0, however, then it is becomes possible to find a solution for Nx and Ny both 
positive and zero profits in both countries, as shown by the following result:  
 
Proposition 3 
Let ) f w e / M )( 1 ( B i i i z i β − ≡  denote the U.S. expenditure on the differentiated good as 
compared to the fixed costs of producing a new variety in each country, i = x,y. When A > 0 and 




(a)  By > Bx > 4; 
(b) A∈(Ay, Ax), where the interval (Ay, Ax) ⊂ R
+ is non-empty.   
 
  When A > 0 then to obtain a zero-profit solution we also need to have By > Bx  as shown 
by (a), which means that the Mexican fixed costs must be higher than the Chinese fixed costs, 
x x x f w e  >  y y y f w e . The further condition that By > Bx  > 4 ensures that the equilibrium number 
of product N exceeds 2, so that at least one product can be produced in each country.
13 Condition 
(b) states the U.S. taste bias towards Mexican varieties must exceed a lower bound Ay > 0, but 
also less than an upper-bound Ax. The interval (Ay, Ax) is defined by the values of Bx and By, as 
shown in the Appendix. Provided that these conditions are met then there exists a zero-profit 
equilibrium with varieties exported to the U.S. by both Mexico and China.  
  Having established the existence of a zero-profit equilibrium, we should also close the 
model to show how the Chinese money supply My and the peso exchange rate ex are established. 
Recall from section 2 that with the cash-in-advance constraints, the goods market equilibrium 
condition for the U.S. can also be interpreted as the asset market equilibrium condition for 
dollars. That gave use one equilibrium condition to determine My and ex. The other equilibrium 
condition comes from examining the goods market equilibrium in either China or Mexico, which 
will be equivalent to the asset market equilibrium for that currency.
14  
  Focusing on China, one unit of the differentiated good is produced with one unit of labor. 
Then the labor used to produce exports to the U.S. is:    
                                                 
13   It turns out that the equilibrium number of products satisfies  y x B N B < < , which generalizes the “square 
root rule” for the equilibrium number of products found by Bergin, Feenstra and Hanson (2007). 
14 By Walras' law, goods/asset market equilibrium in any two countries will imply that that the equilibrium condition 




    Labor demand from Chinese exports to U.S. =  y y
y y
z y y f N
p e




where the first term is the labor used in production, and the second is labor used in fixed costs. 
We assume that the differentiated good is only demanded by the United States, and that China 
does not export anything to Mexico. The Chinese consumers devote β of their expenditure to a 
locally-produced homogeneous good. Then the labor used to produce local goods in China is:  






It follows that the labor market equilibrium condition in China is: 
















  We can simplify this condition by using the zero-profit condition in China, which is 
y y y y z y f w e / M ) 1 ( s = η β − , and also noting that  ) 1 /( w p y y y y − η η = . Using both these 
conditions, as well as the short-run cash-in-advance constraint for China,  y y y M L w = , then we 
can multiply both sides of (28) by the Chinese wage and simplify to obtain: 
   y y
y
z y y M M
e




The first term on the right of (28') is the yuan used to purchase the Chinese exports to the U.S., 
and the second term is the yuan used by Chinese consumers to purchase their local good, so these 
must equal the available currency, My. It follows from (28') that  the equilibrium Chinese money 
supply is:  y z y y y e / M N s M = . Substituting this back into (3), we obtain: 




Holding fixed the Mexican money supply Mx, then (29) gives us the equilibrium peso exchange 
rate ex that is implied by the U.S. money supply; in the background, we are also solving for the 
Chinese money supply from (28'). Notice that (sxNx) is interpreted as the share of the 
differentiated-goods market in the U.S. that is devoted to Mexican varieties, and we could expect 
this share to fall with peso appreciation. If that is the case, then an expansion in the U.S. money 
supply will lead to a smaller equilibrium appreciation of the peso. 
  The full set of short-run equilibrium conditions are (20), (27) and (29), which are five 
equations in five unknowns: the shares sx and sy, the number of products Nx and Ny, and the 
equilibrium peso exchange rate ex in (29). We shall use simulations to perform the comparative 
statics on this system of equations. There are several properties that we find hold consistently in 
the simulations, and can be used to suggest the results that we should expect. Specifically, we 
find that an increase in the U.S. money supply leads to: 
   M z rises     ⇒     ex , Ny and N all rise, with ΔlnNy > ΔlnN. (30) 
It is intuitive that the increase in the U.S. money supply  leads to an appreciation of the peso and 
a rise in the number  of varieties exported from China and in total; we find the greatest relative 
increase in the number of Chinese varieties. 
  With this result, the change in the multilateral index Pm due to entry can also be 
examined. As before, we consider the change in (17a) holding its weights constant, which is 
(18a). Using (15a), the change in the import prices arising only from the increase in export 
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The first terms and the third terms on the right of (32) are negative, since sx > sy , A > 0, and 
total variety N is growing due to the U.S. monetary expansion. This expansion in variety reduces 
markups and prices because of a competitive effect of having more varieties sold. The second 
term on the right of (26) depends on the relative growth of Chinese versus Mexican export 
varieties, and will tend to be positive when Chinese varieties grow more. So the overall impact of 
free entry on the multilateral price index is ambiguous in general, but will be negative whenever 
the first the third terms on the right of (32) dominate the second term. 
  Given that closed form solution is not possible when the number of varieties is 
endogenous, we use numerical solution to study the equilibrium. We choose values for the 
parameters and exogenous variables as follows. Fixed costs of entry for export firms from 
Mexico are set to ensure that the number of firms and hence competition are sufficient to imply a 
markup of  20% over cost (fx =0.5). The entry cost in China is set so that the number of entrants 
implies that Chinese firms represent about a 24% share of the U.S. imported goods market 
(fy=0.005), reflecting the Chinese share in the U.S. consumer goods market at the end of our data 
sample.  We conjecture a strong bias in U.S. preferences toward Mexican goods (αx = 0.9/20 and 




robustness checks to alternative calibrations. We assume no other home bias in preferences (β = 
0.5), and we start with the standard translog case of  γ = 1. For simplicity, exogenous money 
supplies are set to imply steady state wages of unity for both countries, and a unitary steady sate 
exchange rate for China. 
  Table 2 reports pass-through levels for the benchmark as well as several alternative 
calibrations. The experiment is defined as a 10% rise in U.S. money, which in this calibration of 
the model generates a 1% depreciation of the dollar in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate 
defined above. The benchmark calibration indicates that it is possible to achieve a level of pass-
through at or below the level of 0.3 found in our empirical estimates, and near the level of 0.2 
observed in some recent empirical studies. Much of this drop in pass-through comes from free 
entry of new firms and the competitive effect noted above. Without free entry, while pass-
through in this model is still well below unity, it is still well above the empirical estimates. The 
table confirms the conjecture above that a dollar depreciation would induce a rise in the total 
number of firms through new entry from China; there is exit among the Mexican firms, since 
their costs are rising relative to their Chinese competitors. Entry contributes to the low pass-
through in multiple ways. First, the rise in competition forces all firms to lower their markups, 
corresponding to the first term in equation (32) above. This is a direct implication of the translog 
preferences, and is not dependent on China. However, since the entry here is composed of 
Chinese firms, the rise in the China share reduces the willingness of the remaining Mexican 
firms to raise their prices with rising costs, which is an additional effect lowering pass-through. 
Given that our results arise from a very strong and instantaneous entry response, results would 




  Sensitivity analysis indicates that for this calibration of the model the level of home bias 
(β) and the bias in U.S. import preferences toward Mexico (αx), have only moderate effects on 
the degree of pass-through. But the translog parameter γ has larger effects, especially working 
through the competitiveness channel. In fact, for a value of γ = 5, the model shows that pass-
through can easily become negative.  
  Next, we explore the role of the Chinese share by simulating a case where Chinese firms 
are fixed at a share of zero. In this case there is full pass-through of the dollar depreciation to 
import prices. Without the need to compete against firms shielded by a fixed exchange rate, 
Mexican firms are free to raise their prices to reflect their rising costs. Further, the pure 
competitive effect described above also disappears, because rising Mexican costs completely 
offset the rise in sales in the U.S. due to the monetary expansion, so there is no new entry to raise 
competition.  
  Finally, we use the simulation model to study the implications of China allowing greater 
exchange rate flexibility. Suppose a monetary policy rule that balances exchange rate stability 
against monetary stability, with a weight 1-ψ on exchange rate movements:  
   () () ( ) log log 1 log log , 0 1 yy y y MM ee Ψ−= − Ψ− ≤ Ψ ≤ . (33) 
Table 3 shows how progressively higher values of  ψ  imply a greater yuan appreciation in our 
experiment, where column 2 shows Chinese currency appreciation as a ratio to currency 
appreciation for Mexico. As Chinese exchange rate flexibility approaches that of Mexico, the 
pass through gradually rises until it becomes complete. Given that China appears in reality to be 
on a path of greater exchange rate flexibility relative to the dollar, this simulation would seem to 
indicate we should expect pressure for pass through coefficients to rise, possibly reversing the 





7. Conclusion  
  This paper studies how the upward trend in China’s share of U.S. imports could lower 
pass-through of exchange rates to U.S. import prices.  It develops a theoretical model showing 
that the presence of exports from a country with a fixed exchange rate could alter the competitive 
environment in the U.S. market; in particular, it induces exporters from other countries to reduce 
their markups in the face of U.S. depreciations. This effect is amplified when the model allows 
free entry of new exporters, as a U.S. depreciation tends to encourage exit of exporters with 
flexible exchange rates, and hence further raises endogenously the share of suppliers with fixed 
exchange rates like those from China. The model predicts that certain conditions are needed to 
make such a ‘China explanation’ for falling pass-through work. Prominent among these 
conditions is that Chinese exports in a given industry involve a larger number of varieties with a 
smaller average market share per variety than is true for exporters from other competing 
countries. The model indicates that this condition’s validity depends on country biases in U.S. 
preferences. The model also produces a log-linear structural equation for pass-through 
regressions involving the china share of imports. Panel regressions support the role of a rising 
China share in lowering pass-through in the U.S.  
  Viewed more broadly, the results developed in this paper need not be restricted to the 
case of China, but are relevant for all trading partners with a fixed exchange rate. Hence, the 
model predicts that pass-through could fall further if the market share of trading partners with 
fixed exchange rates were to rise; likewise, pass-through could begin to rise if the share of 




  In conclusion, we address a criticism in Marazzi et al (2005) that a China-based 
explanation works better for the case of dollar depreciation, such as that in the mid 2000s, than it 
does a dollar appreciation, as that experienced in the late 1990s. To the contrary, our model 
implies that pass-through is low, regardless of the direction of the exchange rate movement. 
Since pass-through is a matter of changes in price level relative to some previous period rather 
than an absolute level, it is not important to our theoretical argument that the absolute levels of 
Chinese prices tend to be lower on average than prices of other exporters. What matters is that 
the change in costs and hence prices of Chinese firms tend to be less in response to exchange rate 
movements, and this makes exporters from competing countries reluctant to change their prices. 





Proof of Proposition 1: 
  Write (4) in matrix form as: 
 
     p ln ' p ln p ln ' ) p ( e ln 2
1
0 Γ + α + α = ,        ( A 1 )  
where α is the column vector  ; )' ,..., ( N ~ 1 α α  p ln is the column vector  ; )' p ln ,..., p (ln N
~ 1 and Γ is 
the symmetric matrix with elements γij. The share equations are obtained by differentiating (A1), 
obtaining: 
      t p ln s Γ + α = ,       ( A 2 )  
Using the share equation (A2), we can rewrite the expenditure function as, 
     p ln )' s ( ) p ( e ln 2
1
0 + α + α = .         ( A 3 )    
We partition the share vector as  , 0 )' s ,..., s ( s N 1
1 > =  and  0 )' s ,..., s ( s N ~ 1 N
2
t = = + . We 
partition the price vectors 
1 p and 



















= Γ 22 21
12 11
.       ( A 4 )  
The diagonal elements of  Γ are  ] L I N ~ )[ N ~ / ( NxN N
11 − γ − = Γ , where  MxN L  denotes an MxN 
matrix with all elements unity,  ] L I N ~ )[ N ~ / ( ) N N ~ ( x ) N N ~ ( ) N N ~ (
22
− − − − γ − = Γ , and the off-diagonal 
elements are  ) N N ~ ( Nx
12 L ) N ~ / ( − γ = Γ , and  xN ) N N ~ (
21 L ) N ~ / ( − γ = Γ . 
Then the share equations can be rewritten using the reservation prices 
2 p ~  as: 
    ) P / Y ln( p ~ ln p ln s
1 2 12 1 11 1 1 β + Γ + Γ + α = ,      (A5) 
) P / Y ln( p ~ ln p ln 0





Using (A6), we can solve for the reservation prices as: 
    ) p ln ( ) ( p ~ ln
1 21 2 1 22 2 Γ + α Γ − =
− .         ( A 7 )  
Substituting these reservations prices into the expenditure function (A3) using s




1 1 1 1
2
1
0 p ~ ln ' p ln )' s ( ) p ( e ln α + + α + α =  
              ) p ln ( ) ( ' p ln )' s ( 1 21 2 1 22 2
2
1 1 1 1
2
1
0 Γ + α Γ α + + α + α = −     




0 p ln )' s a ( a + + = ,        ( A 8 )    
 
where the last line is obtained by defining: 
2 1 22 12 1 1 ) ( a α Γ Γ − α ≡
− ,       ( A 9 )    
2 1 22 2
0 0 ) ( ' ) 2 / 1 ( a α Γ α − α ≡ − .      ( A 1 0 )    
where we have used the symmetry of  Γ so that 
12 21' Γ = Γ .   
  Likewise solving for 
1 s from (A6), we obtain: 
             ) p ln ( ) ( p ln s
1 21 2 1 22 12 1 11 1 1 Γ + α Γ Γ − Γ + α =
−     
             
1 11 1 p ln C a + = ,           
where the final line is obtained by defining:     
    
21 1 22 12 11 11 ) ( C Γ Γ Γ − Γ ≡
− .       ( A 1 1 )  
Substituting (A12) back into the expenditure function (A8): 




0 p ln C ' p ln a ) p ( e ln + = .      ( A 1 2 )    
To complete the proof, we need to show that the parameters in (A9)-(A11) satisfy (8)-(10), once 




Consider the definition of C
11 in (A11). Notice that from (6) we can express Γ
11 as Γ
11 = 




/ ( NxN N + − γ , and  Γ
12 =  ] L )[ N ~ / ( ) N N ~ ( Nx − γ . Substituting these into (A11): 
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( ) N N
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− − − − xN ) N N
~
( L − . 
Notice that the matrix  ] L I N
~
[ ) N N
~
( x ) N N
~
( ) N N
~
( − − − −  has an eigenvector of  1 x ) N N ~ ( L − (i.e. a column 
vector of unity), with the associated eigenvalue of N. Therefore, its inverse also has an 
eigenvector of  1 x ) N N ~ ( L − , with the eigenvalue of 1/N.  It follows that, 
        C
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~
N / ) N N
~
( [ − γ  
       =  + γ − N I NxN L ) N / (γ , 
where the second line again follows by matrix multiplication and the third line by arithmetic. 
This establishes that (8) holds.  
To establish (9), substitute Γ
22 and  Γ
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where the third line uses the eigenvalue properties definition of  1
) N N ~ ( x ) N N ~ ( ) N N ~ ( ] L I N ~ [ −
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Notice that ∑ + = α
N ~
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To establish (10),  substitute Γ
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which completes the proof.   QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
Using (20), we obtain: 
N
N
















.  It follows that:
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− = . (A13)   
From (20), the difference in shares is  A
1 N 2
1 N








= − . This difference does not vary with 
Ny, for fixed N, so it follows that (A13) is decreasing in Ny, for given N.   
  More generally, substitute  ) s s ( y x −  in (A13) to obtain: 
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Careful inspection of the derivatives of C shows that dC > 0 provided that A < 1. It follows that 
an equi-proportional increase Ny and N lowers pass-through. Since pass-through is decreasing in 
Ny for given N, we conclude that any change in Ny and N satisfying  0 N ln d N ln d y ≥ >  will 
lower pass-through.  QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
To determine whether such a solution exists, we first solve the quadratic equations (27) to obtain 
the expenditure shares on the products of each country: 




i B 4 1 1
B 2
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i f w e
M
B ,     i = x, y.  (A15) 
Notice that si is decreasing in Bi. Since A > 0 implies that sx > sy from (20), this will imply that   
Bx < By  from (A15), which is (a).  Given that condition, we evaluate the difference of the shares 
(sx – sy) from (A15) and the shares (sx – sy) from (20), as: 
  () [] () [ ] A
1 N 2
1 N
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B 2
1
B 4 1 1
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− γ + + − γ + + ≡ − − . (A16) 
  The solution for N occurs where f(N*) = 0. To establish this solution, we simplify the 
problem by assuming γ = 1. We compare the values of  ) B ( f x  and  ) B ( f y . Writing these out, 
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for i = x,y. By careful inspection of the derivative with respect to Bi, it can be shown that this 
expression is decreasing in Bi, which implies that Ay < Ax so the interval (Ay, Ax) is non-empty. 
By construction, for A∈(Ay, Ax) we have  ) B ( f x > 0 and  ) B ( f y < 0. It follows by continuity 
that there exists N* with  x B < N* < y B  satisfying f(N*) = 0. 
  Given N*, use (A13) to solve for the shares 
*
i s , and then (20) to solve for 
*
i N , i = x,y: 
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We need to confirm that these solution for 
*
i N  are both positive. Using γ = 1, the quadratic 




































To ensure  *
y
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x s * N / 1 s > >  we must have: 
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which holds if and only if, 
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x s * N / 1 s > > . It follows from (A15) that  0 N
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Table 1: Dependent Variable – Import Price Index 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 
A. Consumer goods, capital goods, autos and chemicals (Enduse 1-4) 
  FE-OLS PMG 
Exchange rate  0.400**  0.416** 0.448** 0.480** 0.400** 0.430**  0.427** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) 
Export price  0.337**  0.328** 0.330** 0.324** 0.195** 0.206**  0.212** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
China share   0.025**  -0.401** -0.945**   -0.598**  -0.618** 
*Exch. rate   (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.16)    (0.13)  (0.15) 
China share      1.87**  4.01**       
     (0.55)  (0.68)      
Import tariff       -0.187     -0.159 
       (0.12)     (0.11) 
China share       -0.017      
*time       (0.016)     
China share       0.712**     
*(1-China share)       (0.17)      
Observations  2,905  2,905 2,905  2,905  2,634 2,634  2,634 
R
2 or φ  0.641 0.642  0.644  0.647  φ=-0.17** φ=-0.18**  φ=-0.18** 
B. Consumer goods only (Enduse 4)
  FE-OLS PMG 
Exchange rate  0.331** 0.363**  0.476** 0.536** 0.350**  0.465** 0.466** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Export Price  0.088** 0.078*  0.073*  0.086** 0.136**  0.172** 0.172** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
China share   0.024*  -0.583** -1.16**   -0.730**  -0.730** 
*Exch. rate   (0.01)  (0.17)  (0.20)    (0.17)  (0.17) 
China share      2.68**  4.81**      
     (0.73)  (0.86)      
Import tariff       -0.544**     0.002 
       (0.17)      (0.12) 
China share       0.006      
*time       (0.017)     
China share       0.958**     
*(1-China share)       (0.20)      
Observations  1,371 1,371  1,371  1,371  1,242  1,242 1,242 
R
2 or φ  0.628 0.632  0.635  0.645  φ=-0.20** φ=-0.21**  φ=-0.21** 
 
Notes:  * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
Regressions are run over 41 5-digit Enduse categories where no imports are covered by the Information 
Technology Agreement, from September 1993 – December 1999. OLS is estimated with 6 lags of the 
exchange rate, while ‘pooled mean group’ (PMG) is the maximum likelihood estimator for cointegrated 




Table 2: Numerical Simulation Results 
(experiment: 10% rise in U.S. money supply, causing dollar depreciation) 
 
Pass-through 
under free entry 
Pass-through 
under no entry 
 Mexican 
Nx




firms       
%ΔNy
 
Benchmark case*  0.258 0.649  4.07  -4.1%  13.09  27.9% 
Sensitivity analysis:          
β = 0.85  0.268 0.605  1.89  -3.4%  11.54  14.9% 
γ = 2  0.129  0.669  3.11 -4.8% 7.36 37.6% 
γ = 5  -0.149  0.700  2.19 -6.4% 3.39 55.9% 
αx = 0.7/20, αy = 0.3/20  0.266 0.646  4.03  -4.1%  13.70  26.5% 
 
 Zero China share:   1.000 1.000  5.00  0%  0  - 
          
 
* Benchmark calibration: β = 0.5, γ = 1, fx = 0.5, fy = 0.005, αx = 0.9/20, αy = 0.1/20, where 20 is the 




Table 3: Numerical Simulation of Alternative Chinese Exchange Rate Rules 
(experiment: 10% rise in U.S. money supply, causing dollar depreciation) 
 
 
* Calibration: β = 0.5, γ = 1, fx = 0.5, fy = 0.005, αx = 0.9/20, αy = 0.1/20, where 20 is the maximum 




parameter, ψ  %Δ ey/%Δ ex 
Pass-through 
(free entry) 
0 0  0.258 
0.01 0.171  0.418 
0.05 0.519  0.693 
0.10 0.695  0.813 
0.25 0.874  0.924 
0.50 0.954  0.972 
1.00 1.000  1.000 
    